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The article addresses the question of whether the changing roles of “public actor” states and “private
actor” corporations should impact the legal liability of corporations in international law. The classical
paradigm viewed international law as the interactions between sovereign nations and thus was viewed
as encompassing the rights and duties of states who were the exclusive subjects of international law.
However, does this historical distinction remain relevant in our world today? The context of Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”) litigation provides an excellent vehicle to examine the issue. The objection to corporate
liability under the ATS stems from the dichotomy between public state and private actors. Corporate
liability opponents argue that international law involves the relationships between states, or between
states and individuals, as opposed to the relationship between juridical entities such as corporations
and individuals. Prior academic commentary (as well as some judicial rulings) attempted to bridge the
“liability gap” by arguing that since private individuals may have liability for certain jus cogens
violations, corporations as exemplars of “individuals”, should also have liability. Rather than
comparing corporations to private individuals, this Article argues that global corporations can and
should be compared to public actor states. Several developments militate strongly in favor of corporate
liability. One, the financial power and influence global corporations wield over an individual rivals that
of states. Large global corporations now have the ability to cause widespread damage, a power
traditionally held only by states, thus eviscerating the distinction between global corporations and
states. Two, the line of demarcation between states and corporations has been greatly reduced in
recent years as the role and functions of states and private actors have become interchangeable. In
recent years private actors have increasingly assumed public roles as states have outsourced public
functions and services to private parties. Moreover, the line is further blurred because in a parallel
development, state actors are now engaged as private actors through the operation of sovereign
wealth funds and state-owned enterprises. The Article discusses these developments and argues that
any objection to corporate liability based upon the distinction between states and corporations should
be updated to reflect the blurring of the distinction between “public” and “private” actors. If large global
corporations can be treated as actors similar to sovereigns, corporations should have similar duties
and responsibilities towards the public as a state government.
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Do corporations have liability for violating international law? This vexing question is the subject of
vigorous academic and practical debate in the United States in the context of Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)
litigation.1 The ramifications are substantial. If corporations do not have ATS liability then such
entities are effectively immunized from paying damages for violating international law.2 Defendant
corporations have argued that pursuant to international law, juridical entities such as corporations
cannot be liable for international law violations. For example, at oral argument in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum defense counsel argued in response to a question from Justice Breyer that indeed,
a fictitious corporation, “Pirates Inc.” would have no liability for violating international law by
engaging in piracy.3
The question of corporate liability in ATS litigation bridges the worlds of corporate governance, tort
liability, international law and human rights. With the presence of large, sophisticated global
defendants, and in the context of severe violations of international law and the ensuing high financial
stakes, the question of corporate liability has been the subject of vigorous disagreement and scholarly
treatment in both the academic and judicial spheres.4
The ATS enables aliens to file civil claims for violations of “the law of nations” or a “treaty of the
United States,”5 and is illustrative of the global trend of claims against multi-national defendants over
“allegations of corporate misconduct overseas.”6 In recent years, ATS defendants accused of violating
international law overseas7 include global corporations spanning a diverse array of industries: Pfizer8;
128 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The statute states in its entirety: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”.
2Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 150 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 81 U.S.L.W. 4241 (2013) (Leval, J., concurring
only in judgment) (“The new rule offers to unscrupulous businesses advantages of incorporation never before dreamed of.
So long as they incorporate (or act in the form of a trust), businesses will now be free to trade in or exploit slaves, employ
mercenary armies to do dirty work for despots, perform genocides or operate torture prisons for a despot’s political
opponents, or engage in piracy—all without civil liability to victims.”).
3Hrg. Transcr. 25:14–26:5 (Feb. 28, 2012) (available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argum
ent_transcripts/10–1491.pdf). Justice Breyer: Do you think in the 18th century if they brought Pirates, Incorporated, and we
get all their gold, and Blackbeard gets up and he says, oh, it isn’t me; it’s the corporation–do you think that they would
have then said: Oh, I see, it’s a corporation. Good-bye. Go home.
Kathleen Sullivan: Justice Breyer, yes, the corporation would not be liable.
Id. 25:18–26:5. Interestingly, while the appeal to the Supreme Court was based upon the corporate liability issue, the
Court’s opinion did not rule on the question and the issue remains unresolved. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
4See e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Corporate Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the ATS, 53 Va. J. Intl. L. Dig. 18 (2012);
Eric Engle, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: Corporate Liability Under the Alien Torts Statute, 34 Hous. J. Intl. L. 499
(2012); Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability For Extraterritorial Torts Under The Alien Tort Statute And Beyond: An Economic
Analysis, 100 Geo. L. J. 2161 (2012); Julian G. Ku, The Limits Of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 Chi. J. Intl. L.
729 (2012).
528 U.S.C. § 1350. Not all violations of international law are cognizable under the ATS; only misconduct that exhibits a
particularly identifiable and strong transnational dimension and which are sufficiently egregious, are actionable pursuant
to the ATS. See Joel Slawotsky, The New Global Financial Landscape: Why Egregious International Corporate Fraud Should
Be Cognizable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 131, 131–32 (2006) (explaining that only claims
which implicate the “mutual concern of the nations of the world” are permitted under the statute).
6Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in
Transnational Tort Actions, 29 Berkeley J. Intl. Law 456, 457–58 (2011); See also Peter Muchlinski, The Changing Face of
Transnational Business Governance, 18 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud., 665, 687–88 (2011) (discussing recent cases in
continental Europe where corporations have been defendants in suits claiming the corporations are liable for
environmental damage, human rights abuses and war crimes).
7The Supreme Court ruled in Kiobel that the presumption against extraterritoriality as outlined in Morrison v.
Natl. Austrl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) is applicable to the ATS. 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (“We therefore conclude
that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute
rebuts that presumption. ‘[T]here is no clear indication of extraterritoriality here.’”)(citation ommitted) (brackets in
original). However, the Court left many questions unresolved and the parameters of the presumption with respect to
the ATS is unknown. “The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding
the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute . . . . Other cases may arise with allegations of serious violations
of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and
holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial
application may require some further elaboration and explanation.” Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Breyer in his concurrnce joined by three other justices concurred in the affirmance but rejected the presumption
against extraterritoriality. “Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality.” Id. at 1671
(Breyer, J., concurring).
8Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (performing pharmaceutical experiments on children without their
parents’ informed consent).
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Exxon-Mobil9; Yahoo!10; Cisco11 and Rio Tinto.12 Development of transnational tort litigation is not
surprising since large multinationals have become significant players wielding immense power in
determining in the social, economic and legal fate of nations.13 Indeed, “[s]ome transnational
corporations have more economic, social, political, and legal clout than many developing countries.”14
In rejecting corporate liability under the ATS, the Second Circuit in Kiobel,15 embraced the statist
approach to international law. According to the court, “customary international law includes only ‘those
standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and
a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.’”16 The
foundational premise relied upon by Kiobel is that the actors in international law are almost exclusively
states,17 therefore private corporations do not have obligations under international law and thus
cannot have liability under the ATS. Pursuant to Kiobel, if the international law violator defendant Royal
Dutch Petroleum had been a state or public actor there may have been potential liability. However,
since the defendant was a corporation–and a corporation cannot violate international law–there can
be no liability for the defendant’s conduct. Kiobel’s rejection of corporate liability in the ATS context has
engendered vigorous scholarship18 and a split of circuit authority in the United States.19
What is the theoretical foundation of Kiobel’s ruling? Citing treatises20 and other authoritative
sources,21 liability opponents argue that international law involves the relationships between states as
opposed to the relationship between juridical entities such as corporations and individuals. Corporate
liability opponents believe “sovereign States exclusively are International Persons–i.e., subjects of
International Law and neither ‘monarchs, diplomatic envoys, private individuals . . . churches . . .
chartered companies, nor . . . organized wandering tribes’ enjoyed the status of ‘International Persons’
who are “subject[s] of the Law of Nations.”22
9Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (helping governments commit crimes against their own citizens in
order to continue the exploration for crude oil and natural gas).
10Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles With Chinese Families: Firm Gave Officials Dissidents’ E-Mails, Wash. Post D04 (Nov.
14, 2007) (disclosure of a political dissident’s e-mail records in China).
11See John Markoff, Suit Says Cisco Helped China Pursue Falun Gong, N.Y. Times B7 (May 22, 2011) (available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/technology/23cisco.html) (“Cisco, the maker of internet routing gear, customized its
technology to help China track members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, according to a federal lawsuit filed last
week by members of the movement.”).
12Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, racial
discrimination, and environmental torts against mining company).
13Daniel Chow, Counterfeiting as an Externality Imposed by Multinational Companies on Developing Countries, 51 Va.
J. Intl. L., 785, 817 (2011).
14Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing Foreign Direct Investment Law, 18 Mich. St. J. Intl.
L. 1 (2009).
15621 F.3d 111. In an unusual twist, several days after argument the Court ordered additional briefing on the issue of
extraterritoriality. While the appeal to the Supreme Court was based upon the corporate liability question, the Court’s
affirmance of the Second Circuit opinion in Kiobel was based upon extraterritoriality. See supra n. 7 (explaining the Court’s
reasoning).
16Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118 (citing IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
17The Second Circuit’s opinion acknowledged that under certain circumstances individuals may have liability but
juridical entities such as corporations cannot be. Id. at 122 (“nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses suits under the ATS
against the individual perpetrators of violations of customary international law—including the employees, managers,
officers, and directors of a corporation—as well as anyone who purposefully aids and abets a violation of customary
international law.”).
18See e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial
Lawmaking, 51 Va. J. Intl. L. 353 (2011) (arguing against corporate liability); Frank Cruz-Alvarez & Laura E. Wade, Second
Circuit Correctly Interprets the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 1109 (2011) (arguing Kiobel was
correctly decided); Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines
The Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52 Harv. Intl. L. J. Online 119 (2012) (available at http://www.harvardilj.
org/2010/11/online_52_giannini_farbstein/) (arguing in favor of liability).
19Compare Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (holding private corporations cannot have liability) with Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d 11
(holding corporations can have liability).
20See J. L. Brierly, The Law Of Nations: An Introduction To The International Law Of Peace 1 (6th ed. 1963), which defines
international law as “the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with
one another . . . . [A]s a definite branch of jurisprudence the system which we now know as international law is modern, . . .
for its special character has been determined by that of the modern European state system, . . . ”.
21See Restatement (Third) Of The Foreign Relations Law Of The United States § 102(1) (1987), which characterizes rules
of international law as those “that [have] been accepted as such by the international community of states . . . .”.
22L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise vol. 1, 125 (Ronald F. Roxburgh, ed., 3d ed. Longmens, Green and
Co.1920). See also Ku, supra n. 18, at 389 (“There is little or no support from international practice for the imposition of
customary international law duties on corporate entities.”).
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This opposition to corporate liability under international law has its roots in classical public
international law.23 The “United States currently interprets the law of nations, jus gentium, as indicating
public international law . . . . States, as a general rule, are the presumed addressees of duties and
bearers of rights under public international law.”24 Corporate liability opponents have focused solely
on “public international law” and its traditional finding that only states can be actors within
international law.25
Both court decisions and academic commentary have previously addressed the question of ATS
corporate liability. Prior attempts to tackle the question have discussed: refuting Kiobel’s reliance on
international criminal tribunals;26 claiming that corporations can be treated as another form of private
actor;27 noting neither the statute itself nor its history excludes corporations;28 and holding that
international law need not be consulted at all since enforcement of international law is left to the
domestic remedies of states.29 However, little analysis exists as to whether the historical dichotomy
between formal “states” and private “corporations” remains relevant today as a justification for
opposition to corporate liability.
Intriguing questions are raised with respect to whether the changing roles of governments and
private corporations should impact the legal liability of corporations. Demarcations between public
states and private corporations are no longer sharp. Commenting on the changing roles of public and
private actors as exemplified by the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (NSWF), Larry Backer notes “the
distinction between law and norm, between public and private spheres . . . collapses within the
operational universe of the NSWF.”30
In recent years, private actors have increasingly assumed public roles as states have outsourced
public functions and services to private entities such as corporations. Private actors play an
increasingly critical role in traditionally governmental functions. For example, large corporations in the
food industry have replaced the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s responsibility in guaranteeing the
food its citizens eat is safe.31 In a parallel development, state actors have increasingly assumed the role
of private actor by becoming active participants in private markets. Governments are engaged as
private actors through the operation of sovereign wealth funds that buy shares on global stock
exchanges, invest in malls, and enter into joint ventures with private corporations.
This Article will discuss the foundational question and argues that the formalistic distinctions
between “public actor states” and “private actor corporations” are no longer pertinent because
globalization has “de-emphasis[ed] . . . the integrity of the territorial borders of states” and the
changing roles of states and private actors are “questioning the organizational frameworks on
which the conventional global order has been based.”32
Both large global corporations and states have the resources that can and do affect people’s lives in
an unprecedented fashion and degree. Large global corporations are at the epicenter of astonishing
23See Engle, supra n. 4, at 501 (explaining how international law is dividable into public and private international law).
24Id. at 502.
25Courts have used these terms interchangeably. E.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 n. 3 (“In this opinion we use the terms ‘law
of nations’ and ‘customary international law’ ‘interchangeably.’”).
26See Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d at 53 (rejecting the notion that the Nuremburg Military Tribunal rejected corporate liability);
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–19 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding Kiobel’s reliance on the failure of
international criminal tribunals to prosecute corporations is misplaced); See also Giannini & Farbstein, supra n. 18, at 129
(noting that Judge Cabranes reliance on the Nuremburg Military Tribunal’s failure to prosecute the I.G. Farben company was
misplaced because the Allies punished the IG Farben, dissolving the corporation and destroying some of its facilities,
demonstrating corporations do indeed have obligations).
27See Joel Slawotsky, Corporate Liability in Alien Tort Litigation, 1 Va. J. Intl. L. Online 27, 37–40 (2011) (available at
http://www.vjil.org/articles/corporate-liability-in-alien-tort-litigation) (private actor corporations should be treated as
private actors and have liability for committing violations of international law).
28See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 748 (“The ATS contains no such language and has no such legislative history to suggest that
corporate liability was excluded and that only liability of natural persons was intended. We therefore find no basis for
holding that there is any such statutory limitation.”).
29See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020 (“International law imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations decide
how to enforce them.”).
30See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets Based Transnational Legislative Power: The Norwegian
Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 10 (Working Paper, November 18, 2012, Consortium for Peace & Ethics,
No. 2012–11/11) (available at SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2177778).
31Stephanie Armour et al., Food Sickens Millions as Company-Paid Checks Find It Safe, Bloomberg.com (Oct. 11, 2012)
(available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012–10-11/food-sickens-millions-as-industry-paid-inspectors-find-it-s
afe.html).
32See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance, 18 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 751, 754–55 (2011).
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and multifaceted governance systems “developing outside the state and international public
organizations, and beyond the conventionally legitimating framework of the forms of domestic or
international hard law.”33 Indeed, a consequence of globalization is the decline of the state’s exclusive
power over the lives of citizens and the rise of the state-like role of the large corporation. “Globalization
has led to a shift in power away from states and towards the private sector, which has resulted in
multinational corporations taking a place among the most powerful international actors.”34
Moreover, role reversal has eviscerated the historic differences between states and corporations.
“In effect, the state here is using private power to effect public governance objectives. By inverting its
role, it can regulate more effectively as a private shareholder than as a state.”35
Furthermore, responsibilities once relegated to states are now devolving to private actors as well.
Sovereign wealth funds exemplify this new role. Norway, via its sovereign wealth fund (SWF) “has
begun to import into private investment markets the obligations of international law once limited
to states.”36
Similar to state actors, corporations are capable of inflicting enormous damage, either directly or
by or aiding and abetting.37 If large global corporations can be treated as actors similar to
sovereigns, corporations should “have the same duties and responsibilities towards its constituents
as a state government”38 and the academic underpinning relied upon by Kiobel is eliminated.
Accordingly, the holding of Kiobel excluding private corporations as actors with obligations under
international law, is incongruous with a globalized world wherein such actors are capable of causing
severe harm similar to sovereigns. In Part One, this Article describes the ATS and provides a
background to the corporate liability question including a summary of the current appellate case law.
In Part Two, the arguments used by liability opponents are explored. In Part Three, arguments are
presented demonstrating that the arguments of the liability opponents are no longer relevant and
should be discarded.
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE CORPORATE LIABILITY QUESTION
A. Preliminary considerations
Before discussing the corporate liability question, it is worthwhile to note some unique facets of ATS
litigation. Notwithstanding the exceptional aspects of the statute, the ATS provides an excellent
structure from which to explore the issue of corporate responsibility for international law violations.
1. Unique aspects of the ATS
The ATS is an unconventional statute for several reasons. First, it is a 200-year-old statute with very
limited existing legislative history.39 The lack of knowledge regarding the legislative intent also bears on
the dearth of information regarding the statute’s purpose(s) and goal(s). Second, for nearly 200 years
the ATS remained in relative anonymity with only a handful of cases brought under the statute.40 Thus,
despite being in existence for 200 years, many essential questions (such as the corporate liability issue)
have only recently been grappled with. Third, until relatively recently, a question remained as to whether
the statute conferred a statutory cause of action. Nearly 200 years after Congress enacted the ATS, the
Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala41 “paved the way for a new conceptualization of the ATS.”42The
Second Circuit read “the law of nations” as a malleable grant of jurisdiction that can expand as
33Id. at 751.
34Jonathan Bellish, Towards A More Realistic Vision Of Corporate Social Responsibility Through The Lens of the Lex
Mercatoria, 40 Denv. J. Intl. L. & Policy, 548 (2012).
35See Backer, supra n. 30, at 39.
36Id. at 75 (noting that the Norwegian SWF’s Ethics Council is requiring corporations to uphold international law or risk
divestment).
37Unquestionably, “colossal harms” may arise when corporations engage in misconduct. See José Alvarez, Are
Corporations “Subjects” of International Law, 9 Santa Clara J. Intl. L. 1, 5 (2011).
38See Katharine v. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative
Analysis, 7 Hastings Bus. L. J. 309, 331 (2011).
39See also ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d. Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds, Morrison v. Natl. Austrl.
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (“This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us
since the first Judiciary Act, no one seems to know whence it came.”) (citation omitted).
40See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16 U. St.
Thomas L. Rev. 607, 609 (2004).
41Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980).
42Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, supra n. 40, at 609.
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international proscription of an allegedly violative act becomes more uniform.43 Until the Supreme
Court endorsed Filartiga’s understanding that the ATS granted jurisdiction, the opinions were divided
on whether the ATS conferred a statutory cause of action.44 Fourth, the statute explicitly recognizes and
incorporates international law. Fifth, while the ATS ostensibly wields extraterritorial reach, the Supreme
Court has upheld the presumption against extraterritoriality with respect to the ATS.45
Finally, the ATS is unique in that it has served as a method to punish (with civil damages) corporate
defendants for international crimes. There is a strong policy argument in favor of allowing corporate
liability. While criminal liability would tend to deter such conduct and likely lead to a reduction of same,
no international court, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), can even prosecute businesses.
As currently standing, the ICC does not have such jurisdiction.46
2. ATS limitations
The ATS does not constitute a tonic to remedy corporate misconduct. Challenges exist for plaintiffs
seeking compensation for the conduct of transnational corporations pursuant to the ATS. For example,
only defendants subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States can be held accountable. In
addition, there is a presumption against extraterritoriality. And courts are under admonition from the
U.S. Supreme Court to only allow certain universally-acknowledged violations as predicate offenses.
This serves to limit the types of violations that can constitute actionable claims under the ATS.47 There
are also numerous doctrines available to defendants to have cases dismissed such as international
comity, forum non conveniens and political question. Numerous suits are dismissed based upon forum
non conveniens by courts finding that an alternative forum would be more appropriate.48
3. Domestic and international contexts
In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in public awareness of both possible human rights
abuses conducted by multi-national corporations (“MNCs”) and the lack of safeguards ensuring good
corporate governance. A substantial factor militating in favor of corporate change has been the
internet, which provides an inexpensive and convenient method of instant communication and
information swapping, thus empowering individuals who possess negative information regarding
MNCs and who wish to disseminate the same to shareholders and consumers. Shareholders and
institutional investors have commenced pressuring MNCs to adopt and adhere to codes of good
corporate conduct. Both individual and institutional stakeholders have begun to exercise their
influence in a meaningful way. For example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) will only invest in corporations that adhere to the Global Sullivan Principles. These principles
are designed to prompt and guide a corporation into sound corporate governance. CalPERS has
divested from nations based on the nations’ human rights violations.
In the United States, the business community has been a key opponent of ATS suits and of corporate
liability in particular. Business interests argue against holding corporations liable, alleging American
businesses lose out to competitors who are not subject to ATS suits. These opponents view the ATS
mechanism as detrimental to American business interests providing defendants not subject to suit with
economic advantages. In addition, policy opponents believe that the ATS is a form of “judicial
imperialism” endangering America’s relations with other nations who will view ATS suits as a form
of interference in their own affairs. Of course, political considerations come into play as some
43The court held “courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today.” Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
44See e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J. Intl. L. 587, 592–594 (2002) (arguing that,
because the ATS was a part of the Judiciary Act, it merely granted jurisdiction to federal courts); William R. Casto, The
Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467,
478–80 (1986) (asserting that the ATS “clearly does not create a statutory cause of action,” but may have created a common
law cause of action).
45See supra n. 7, at 1669.
46See Rome Statute of the ICC http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm Article 25 (jurisdiction only
over natural persons).
47See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)(“A series of reasons argue for judicial caution when
considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the early statute.”). See e.g.,
Anderson, supra n. 14 at 4 (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (“Plaintiffs alleging
harms by transnational corporations face substantive and procedural hurdles . . . . [M]any claims do not rise to the level of
violating the law of nations, as required under the Alien Tort Statute.”).
48Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda III), 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002).
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U.S. administrations are more “ATS friendly” than others. Sometimes courts ask for the view of the U.S.
State Department which, depending upon the political winds, may or may not find the suit an
interference with U.S. government policy.49
A global movement towards imposing obligations gained momentum in the 1990s with the United
Nations issuing findings and recommendations on the corporate responsibilities under international
law. One significant report was released by the UN Commission on Human Rights: Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights.50 Another major report was the Promotion of All Human Rights, Civil, Poltical, Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development released by the UN Secretary General.51 The
reports endorse international norms and mechanisms to impose legal duties and regulations on
corporations under international law.
The Norwegian SWF represents a major step in the process of imposing international legal
obligations on corporations. Through its Ethics Council, the Norwegian SWF reviews companies and
will exclude and divest from companies that it believes violate international law and/or engage in
unethical corrupt behavior. International politics again plays a role as some nations will object to
having its companies divested or placed on an observation status. Norway’s SWF decided that its
investment portfolio would not include cluster bomb manufacturers and nuclear weapons producers.
As a result, certain American companies were banned from the fund. Affected companies included
iconic American businesses such as General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing and Lockheed
Martin. Norway’s SWF also blacklisted Walmart based upon child labor practices and anti-union
activities. The United States Ambassador to Norway stated in response to the divestment of Walmart,
that “[a]n accusation of bad ethics is not an abstract thing. They’re alleging serious misconduct. It is
essentially a national judgment of the ethics of these companies.”52
B. The Statute and litigation
The Alien Tort Statute provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”53
The statute allows non-U.S. citizens to sue American or foreign54 defendants in federal court for
tortuous conduct constituting a violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law)55 or a treaty. To be
cognizable under the ATS, the conduct violates the “law of nations” if it contravenes well-established
recognized norms of international law that involve the mutual interests of nations and have the specter
of global relationship impact.56 Torts that do not meet these requirements cannot form the basis of an
ATS suit.57 Claims are generally framed in the context of egregious violations of human rights such as
slavery,58 war crimes, and59 crimes against humanity.60 However, the statute contains no restrictive
49See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, Policy
Analyses in Intl. Econ. (2003). (available at http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/367.html).
50See refworld, reprinting UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) (available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page¼category&
category¼REFERENCE&publisher¼UNSUBCOM&type¼SESSIONALREPORT&coi¼&docid¼403f46ec4&skip¼)
(last accessed May 20, 2013).
51See UN Human Rights Council, Promotion of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc A/HRC/11/13 (2009) (available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf) (last accessed May 20, 2013).
52Mark Landler, Norway Keeps Nest Egg From Some U.S. Companies, N.Y. Times (May 4, 2007) (available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/worldbusiness/04norway.html?_r¼3&oref¼slogin&) (last accessed May 20, 2013).
5328 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
54Suit is of course subject to the court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction. In addition, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the presumption against extraterritoriality is applicable to ATS cases although questions regarding the contours
remain. See supra n. 7, and accompanying text.
55See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 n. 3 (“In this opinion we use the terms ‘law of nations’ and ‘customary international law’
interchangeably.”).
56See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[C]ustomary international law is composed only
of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”).
57See Slawotsky, supra n. 5, at 150 (“Many torts have been rejected as predicate offenses permitted under the ATCA.”).
58Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).
59Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
60Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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language, and while international law is often framed in a criminal context, suits may be based upon
violations of international law in other contexts.61 Some have argued that commercial bribery and
egregious corporate fraud may also be subject to ATS suits.62 Given that transnational corporations are
responsible for misconduct outside the strict limit of human rights violations, such as environmental
catastrophes and corruption, it may be a matter of time before such conduct might trigger
ATS litigation.63
For nearly 200 years, relatively few cases were filed pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.64 This relative
dormancy ended when in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit issued a landmark ruling whereby
the statute was relied upon to find that state-sponsored torture was actionable.65 The issue in Filartiga
was whether torture constituted a “violation of the law of nations” and thus cognizable under the
ATS.66 To be actionable, plaintiffs needed to establish there was an international consensus with
respect to torture being a violation of international law.67 According to the Second Circuit, “[i]t is only
where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an
international law violation within the meaning of the [ATS].”68
Filartga held that in determining whether specific conduct constituted a violation of international law,
a court was to examine judicial opinions, scholarly works and custom.69 Significantly, the court stated
that international law had to be applied as it is used “today” and not from 200 hundred years prior70
noting that international law evolves over time.71 The Second Circuit found that torture was a
“well-established, universally recognized norm [ ] of international law” that was cognizable under
the statute.72
After Filartiga, plaintiffs commenced vigorously filing ATS cases. Such cases included ones against
government officials alleging various human rights abuses.73 Plaintiffs also commenced suing
corporations, usually alleging these defendants aided and abetted the governments or officials in
violating international law.74
In Sosa v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court addressed the ATS and held the statute is jurisdictional,75 thus
permitting federal courts to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for violations of international law noting
such law was part of federal common law.76 The Court held the statute was initially intended to
encompass the three primary violations of international law at the time of its enactment: piracy,
offenses against ambassadors, and violations of safe passage.77 However, the Court endorsed the
Filartiga view that international law develops over time and held that courts were available to entertain
claims for violations of the “present-day law of nations.”78 Sosa cited approvingly to Filartiga stating,
61See e.g., Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163 (informed medical consent).
62See Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations are Liable for
Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 Mich. J. Intl. L.385, 393–95 (2010); Slawotsky, supra n. 5, at 131.
63One case so alleging was recently filed by a Turkish company against a South African company for allegedly bribing
Iranian officials to procure lucrative contracts. See Tom Schoenberg & Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, MTN Promised Iran Money,
UN Votes for Phone Deal: Rival, Bloomberg.com (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-28/
mtn-promised-money-weapons-un-votes-in-iran-rival-says.html
(“MTN Group Ltd. (MTN), Africa’s largest wireless operator, bribed officials, arranged meetings between Iranian and
South African leaders, and promised Iran weapons and United Nations votes in exchange for a license to provide mobile-
phone service in the Islamic Republic, Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri AS (TCELL) alleged in a lawsuit.
Turkcell, which initially was awarded the Iranian mobile-phone license, sued its Johannesburg-based rival yesterday
in federal court in Washington for $4.2 billion in damages. The suit includes numerous alleged internal MTN memos that
detail the company’s efforts to win the Iranian business after losing the bid to Turkcell in February 2004.”)
64See ITT, 519 F.2d at 1015 (noting the dearth of cases).








73See e.g., In re Est Marcos, Hum. Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
74See e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
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“[t]he position we take today has been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the
Second Circuit decided Filartiga.”79 Simultaneously, the Court urged caution with respect to embracing
the types of international law violations that should be cognizable. The Court provided some guidance,
namely, to come within the ambit of the ATS, a violation should “rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of
the 18th-century paradigms.”80
Thus, subject to diligent gate keeping, the federal courts were empowered to adjudicate cases
brought by aliens for violations of international law other than the three original paradigm examples. In
the years subsequent to Sosa, a variety of such claims were filed and the courts continue to grapple
with many of the vigorously debated issues.81 Regarding corporate liability, the only reference in Sosa
was in a footnote wherein the Court stated that “[a] related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”82
The footnote was relied upon by Kiobel in holding the question of corporate liability is determined by
reference to international law.83 However, the footnote did not explicitly state or imply there was an
issue of corporate liability but addressed whether liability for the type of conduct at issue can be
extended to a private actor—such as a corporation.84 The private actor might be an individual or a
corporation and no distinction was articulated. If anything, the Court seemed to be confirming that
corporate liability exists under the ATS.
C. Summary of case law on the corporate liability issue
For more than two decades, U.S. courts held that private actors, including individuals85 and private
corporations,86 owe duties under customary international law and may have liability under the
statute. Clearly presuming corporations may face liability under the ATS, corporations such as
Yahoo!87 and Shell Oil88 have either settled or proceeded to trial like Chevron89 and Drummond
Corporation.90
Overturning its own precedent,91 the Second Circuit’s majority opinion in Kiobel held that
corporations do not have obligations under international law and thus cannot have liability under
79Id. at 731.
80Id. at 725.
81For example, the issue of what standard is sufficient to find a defendant liable for secondary liability. Compare Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc. 658 F.3d 388, 398 (4thCir.2011) (purposeful conduct); The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 582 F.3d
244, 258–59 (2d Cir.2009) (purposeful conduct) with Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d at 38 (mere knowledge is sufficient).
82Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n. 20.
83Kiobel relied on the footnote in rejecting corporate liability. The court referenced and adopted a footnote in the
Supreme Court’s 2004 Sosa ruling wherein the Court stated that federal courts must examine international law to decide
the question of whether that law “extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued.” See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n. 20). Compare Kiobel (invoking footnote 20 to reason that
the question of corporate liability must be resolved by reference to international law) with Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d 11
(positing that Kiobel’s reliance on footnote 20 was misplaced).
84See Slawotsky, supra n. 27, at 35 (“The Court held that international law controls the question of whether the specific
conduct alleged gives rise to liability if the defendant is a private non-state actor. The context of the footnote and the
reference to Judge Edwards’ concurrence in the D.C. Circuit’s Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic opinion and to the Second
Circuit’s Kadic v. Karadžić opinion make it manifestly clear the Court was not questioning the viability of suing
corporations.”).
85See e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Marcos Est., 25 F.3d 1467.
86See e.g.,Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103–104 (2d Cir. 2000); Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445; In
re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“On at least nine separate occasions, the
Second Circuit has addressed ATCA cases against corporations without ever hinting—much less holding—that such
cases are barred.”).
87Rampell, supra n. 10, at D04.
88Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. Times, B1 (June 8, 2009) (available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html?_r¼0).
89Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (“These plaintiffs brought claims under the Alien Tort
Statute (‘ATS’), Nigerian law, and California law. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Chevron on all claims, and Plaintiffs
now appeal . . . . We . . . affirm the district court’s judgment.”).
90Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ne claim for relief that Drummond aided and
abetted the killings, which were war crimes, remained. At a trial of that claim, the jury returned a verdict for Drummond . . . .
We affirm.”).
91See e.g., S. African Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (“On at least nine separate occasions, the Second Circuit has
addressed ATCA cases against corporations without ever hinting—much less holding—that such cases are barred.”).
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the ATS.92 Kiobel relied upon the Sosa footnote reference to corporations to hold that the question of
corporate liability turns on whether international law provides for same.93 The majority held that
pursuant to Supreme Court-ordered guidance in the Sosa opinion, federal courts are to examine
international law to decide the question of whether that law “extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued.”94 Relying upon that footnote, Kiobel,
examined international law and citing to international criminal tribunals,95 treaties96 and scholarship,97
found such law did not encompass corporate liability.98 The court based its decision on its conclusion
that international law did not involve actors other than states. According to the court, “customary
international law includes only ‘those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their
common good and/or in dealings inter se.’”99
Kiobel ruled that the only actors in international law are states.100 According to the Second Circuit, it
is now up to Congress to decide whether the statute can impose corporate liability but “[f]or now, and
for the foreseeable future, the Alien Tort Statute does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against corporations.”101
The first post-Kiobel appellate ruling was the District of Columbia Court of Appeals opinion in
Doe v. Exxon.102 In Exxon, the court held corporations may indeed have liability in ATS suits and called
the Second Circuit opinion internally inconsistent and illogical. The court found Kiobel’s:
analysis conflates the norms of conduct at issue in and the rules for any remedy to be found in
federal common law at issue here; even on its own terms, its analysis misinterprets the import
of footnote 20 in Sosa and is unduly circumscribed in examining the sources of customary
international law.103
Citing both Louis Henkin and Judge Edwards’ Tel-Oren opinion, the Exxon court ruled that
international law itself provides no remedies for its violations, rather individual nations determine
whether and how such violations should be addressed. The court stated:
TheATSprovides federal jurisdictionwhere the conduct at issue fits a normqualifying underSosa
implies that for purposes of affording a remedy, if any, the law of the United States and not the
law of nations must provide the rule of decision in an ATS lawsuit. Consequently, the fact that
the law of nations provides no private right of action to sue corporations addresses the wrong
question anddoes not demonstrate that corporations are immune from liability under the ATS.104
The court held the domestic remedy for violations of international law is left for the individual
nations. Therefore, the ATS may be used to enforce international law norms.
The Exxon court also relied upon the argument that a corporation is merely a variant of an individual.
According to the court, Kiobel is inherently contradictory inasmuch as the Kiobel majority concedes
that “individuals” from a corporation may have liability. If, as Kiobel admits, individuals have liability,
a juridical entity may also have liability.
Because international law generally leaves all aspects of the issue of civil liability to
individual nations, there is no rule or custom of international law to award civil damages in
any form or context, either as to natural persons or as to juridical ones. If the absence of a
92Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149. While Judge Leval concurred in the judgment based upon other grounds, he vigorously
disagreed on the corporate liability issue. See id. at 151 (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment).
93Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n. 20.
94Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127 (“In Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the lower federal courts to consider ‘whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the





99Id. at 118 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
100Kiobel acknowledged that under certain circumstances individuals may have liability but juridical entities such as
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS. See id. at 122 (“[N]othing in this opinion limits or forecloses suits under
the ATS against the individual perpetrators of violations of customary international law—including the employees,
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universally accepted rule for the award of civil damages against corporations means that
U.S. courts may not award damages against a corporation, then the same absence of a
universally accepted rule for the award of civil damages against natural persons must mean
that U.S. courts may not award damages against a natural person. But the majority opinion
concedes (as it must) that U.S. courts may award damages against the corporation’s
employees when a corporation violates the rule of nations. Furthermore, our circuit and
others have for decades awarded damages, and the Supreme Court in Sosa made clear
that a damage remedy does lie under the ATS. The majority opinion [in Kiobel ] is thus
internally inconsistent and is logically incompatible with both Second Circuit and Supreme
Court authority.105
The decision is also noteworthy in that in broad terms, it embraces the ATS plaintiffs’ bar arguments
that corporations may have liability under international law citing to the Allied dismemberment of
corporate violators of international law after WWII.106
Several days after the Exxon ruling, the Seventh Circuit, in Flomo v. Firestone,107 similarly held
corporations may indeed have liability in ATS suits. Describing Kiobel as a rebel opinion, the court
did not mince words. It called the Kiobel ruling wrong.
All but one of the cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the latter) that corporations can be
liable . . . The outlier is the split decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111
(2d Cir. 2010), which indeed held that because corporations have never been prosecuted,
whether criminally or civilly, for violating customary international law, there can’t be said to be a
principle of customary international law that binds a corporation. The factual premise of the
majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.108
As to the substantive corporate liability argument, Flomo disagreed with the Second Circuit and
found that international law had in fact been used by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals to punish
corporations.109 The court also held that international law does not control the question of liability
which is a matter of domestic enforcement. The court used the following analogy:
If a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes could be punished criminally for violating
customary international law, as we believe it could be, then a fortiori if the board of directors of
a corporation directs the corporation’s managers to commit war crimes, engage in piracy,
abuse ambassadors, or use slave labor, the corporation can be civilly liable.
*****
If a corporation has used slave labor at the direction of its board of directors, then whether the
board members should be prosecuted as criminal violators of customary international law-or
also or instead be forced to pay damages, compensatory and perhaps punitive as well, to the
slave laborers-or, again also or instead, whether the corporation should be prosecuted
criminally and/or subjected to tort liability-all these would be remedial questions for the
tribunal, in this case our federal judiciary, to answer in light of its experience with particular
remedies and its immersion in the nation’s legal culture, rather than questions the answers to
which could be found in customary international law.110
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto,111 the Ninth Circuit joined the D.C. and Seventh Circuit post-Kiobel rulings
finding that corporations may have liability under the ATS. Rejecting defendant Rio Tinto’s argument
that the ATS does not allow for corporate liability, the court noted that neither the text of the statute
nor the legislative history indicates any restrictive language limiting the scope of liability to
non-corporations.112 The court held the appropriate determinative factor for determining whether
international law extends liability to a defendant is “not whether there is a specific precedent so
holding, but whether international law extends its prohibitions to the perpetrators in question.”113
A clear U.S. federal circuit court split exists between the Ninth, Seventh, D.C., and Eleventh114 Circuits,










114Prior to Kiobel, the Eleventh Circuit held corporations may have liability. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578
F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have . . . recognized corporate defendants are subject to liability under the ATS
and may be liable for violations of the law of nations.”).
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corporate liability. The Second Circuit’s Kiobel ruling was slated to be resolved by the Supreme Court.115
“Kiobel reflects a deep and significant split at the circuit courts, because it concernsU.S. international legal
obligations, because the stakes, in human and financial terms are high, because it was so obviously
wrongly decided, the split that Kiobel represents has reached the U.S. Supreme Court.”116
However, the Supreme Court did not rule on the corporate liability issue. While the Court affirmed the
Second Circuit’s Kiobel dismissal it so ruled based upon the presumption against extraterritorial
application of the ATS. The Court held “[o]n these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the
United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”117 The
only reference to corporations was the Court’s statement—in the context of whether the conduct
sufficiently touches and concerns the U.S.—that “[c]orporations are often present in many countries,
and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”118
In a concurrence by Justice Breyer, four Justices rejected the presumption finding the statute provides
jurisdiction where:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest,
and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.119
The issue of corporate liability remains relevant because many of the potential defendants will be
U.S. companies and, moreover, even foreign defendants may be unable to invoke the extraterritoriality
argument depending on the extent their conduct touches and concerns the U.S.120
The next section discusses the rationale underpinning the argument that corporations do not have
obligations under international law and thus bear no liability under the ATS. In support of this view,
liability opponents cite to the historical dichotomy between private actor juridical entities such as
“corporations” and formal “states”. According to liability opponents, the ATS is applicable only to
“states” since sovereign nations are the principal actors in international law.
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL PREMISE AGAINST CORPORATE LIABILITY
The question of non-state actor liability for violating international law:
remains an area of substantial academic interest and public activity. In particular, focus has shifted
beyond human beings, the “subjects” of international law in areas of armed conflict or human rights,
and toward other non-state entities. As Philip Alston suggests, this includes “transnational
corporations and other large-scale business entities, private voluntary groups such as churches,
labour unions, and human rights groups, and [ ] international organizations including the United
Nations itself, theWorld Bank, the InternationalMonetary Fund, and theWorld TradeOrganization.121
115The Court heard two rounds of argument, one on the issue of corporate liability, followed by an unusual Court request
for the parties to brief the issue of extraterritoriality (available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argum
ent_transcripts/10–1491.pdf). Argument on the extraterritoriality issue was held in October 2012. See http://harvardhum
anrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/10–1491rearg.pdf (transcript of oral argument).
116Engle, supra n. 4, at 500.
117Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. While five Justices so held, Justice Kennedy, part of the majority, stated questions remain
regarding the applicability of the presumption to specific cases. “The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a
number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute . . . . Other cases may arise
with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA
nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation.” Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Commentators have noted the myriad of possible ways conduct may “touch and concern” the United States. Opinio Juris,
Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Degrees of Territoriality, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/22/kiobel-insta-symposi
um-degrees-of-territoriality/ (noting potential ways conduct may “touch and concern” the U.S. such as planning, financing,
designing, profiting) (last accessed June 7, 2013).
118Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. A reasonable inference from the senetence would be the Court is tacitly endorsing
corporate liability.
119Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
120See Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, (Bloomberg Law,
SCOTUSblog (Apr. 18, 2013) (available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-
open-to-foreign-squared-cases) (U.S. corporate defendants cannot invoke the presumption argument); Opinio Juris, Marty
Lederman Kiobel Insta-Symposium: What Remains of the ATS? http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-symposium-
what-remains-of-the-ats/ (“Cases alleging Sosa-sufficient torts committed overseas by U.S. defendants” may still be
actionable) (last accessed June 8, 2013).
121Ku, supra n. 4, at 735 (brackets in original).
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Corporate liability opponents argue that corporate liability does not comport with international
law.122 The ATS provides that aliens can file claims for violations of “the law of nations” or a “treaty of
the United States.”123 Although the terms “international law” and “law of nations” are frequently used
interchangeably,124 as noted by Eric Engle:
The law of nations (jus gentium), colloquially known as international law, is divided into two
branches: public international law and private international law (also known as jus gentium
privatum). Public international law consists of two further branches, customary international law
(jus gentium publicum) and international treaty law (just inter gentes). The United States currently
interprets the law of nations, jus gentium, as indicating public international law, even though jus
gentium consists of two distinct parts, jus gentium publicum and just gentium privatum.125
The ATS’s “law of nations” therefore should include both public and private international law thereby
including “private actors” within the reach of the statute. However, liability opponents have focused on
the public international law branch of “the law of nations” to base their arguments that the ATS does
not cover non state actors.126 The classical paradigm of public international law viewed states as “the”
actors in international law and private individuals as “the” actors in private international law.127 It is this
perceived gulf of responsibility within public international law between formal state actors and juridical
organizations that forms the basis of intellectual opposition to corporate liability under the ATS.128
Conventionally, international law was defined as:
the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their
relations with one another . . . . [A]s a definite branch of jurisprudence the system which we now
know as international law is modern . . . for its special character has been determined by that of
the modern European state system . . . 129
International law was interpreted as encompassing the rights and duties of states130 who were thus
the exclusive subjects of international law.131 According to this view,
The lengthy majority opinion issued by the Second Circuit in Kiobel outlines the correct law: The
ATS clearly cannot be applied to corporations because they are not liable under customary
international law.132
The statist motif of international law opines “the only real subjects of persons in international law are
states and their creations, mainly organizations consisting of states as members such as those of the
U.N. system.”133 Essentially, international law was viewed as a series of rules and conduct accepted
within the international community of sovereigns excluding juridical organizations, such as
corporations, which by definition are not members of the international community of states.134 Thus,
“international law” consisted of the relationships between sovereign nations as opposed to
relationships between nations and individuals.135
122See e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118 (“[C]ustomary international law includes only ‘those standards, rules or customs (a)
affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for
their common good and/or in dealings inter se.’”)
12328 U.S.C. § 1350.
124ATS courts have often referred to international law as “customary international law.” See e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 n.
3 (“In this opinion we use the terms ‘law of nations’ and ‘customary international law’ interchangeably.”).
125See Engle, supra n. 4, at 501–502. Indeed, as pointed out by Engle, the ATS itself supports the two branches of public
international law by reference to treaties. Id. at 512–513 (“[T]he Kiobel court’s willful blindness to international treaty law
(jus inter gentes) is contrary to the black letter law of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) itself”.).
126As pointed out by Eric Engle, this narrow focus may be misplaced.
127Id. at 502 (“Private international law is most often accessed in the U.S. context through ‘conflicts of law’ i.e., the rules
for allocating decisional authority in cross-jurisdictional contexts.”).
128Id. at 504 (“The schism between the ideas that first, states are the principal addressees of public international law,
and second, that rights and duties may be ascribed to non-state actors under public international law is one key to
understanding the significance of the Alien Torts Statute in the corporate context.”).
129See Brierly, supra n. 20, at 1.
130Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, 22 Eur. J. Intl. L 627, 629 (2011).
131Id. at 635.
132Cruz-Alvarez & Wade, supra n. 18, at 1131.
133Alvarez, supra n. 37, at 8.
134See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(1) (1987), which characterizes rules of
international law as those “that [have] been accepted as such by the international community of states.”
135See e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of International Law, 36 New Eng. L. Rev.
815, 816 (2002) (“[W]hat sovereign governments did within their own borders was of no concern to their neighbors. States
were the subjects of international law; international law regulated only political and economic relations between states,
not within them.”).
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Julian Ku supports the no corporate liability view:136
For over two decades, U.S. courts have held that private corporations owe duties under
customary international law and can be subject to lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) . . . . Despite this wide support, the view that corporations can be liable for violations of
customary international law under the ATS is wrong.137
Ku argues that corporations cannot have liability under international law and opposes corporate
liability under the ATS. “It is axiomatic that traditional international law treats states as its exclusive
subjects. In the view of this traditional conception, only states had international legal personality and
the capability to assert rights and to bear duties under international law.”138 While individuals “may”
have liability under certain limited circumstances, corporations cannot.139
Non-state parties, such as private individuals, organizations, or corporations, owe duties under
only domestic laws and cannot violate international law directly.140
According to liability opponents, there is a quid pro quo wherein only states are subject to
international law. “In this traditional conception, individual human beings and other non-state entities
simply did not exist on the international plane.” But, in return, private actors such as individuals and
corporations have no international law duties. “On the other hand, non-state actors owed no duties
under international law either.”141
There is however, academic disagreement.
For centuries, there have been vast numbers of formally recognized actors in the international
legal process other than the state, although far too many assume incorrectly that traditional or
classical international law had been merely state-to-state and that under traditional
international law individuals and various other non-state actors did not have rights or duties
based directly in international agreements or customary international law.142
Paust refers to the states only view as misguided:
[F]or the last two hundred and fifty years international law has not been merely state-to-state. At
best, claims to the contrary have been profoundly mistaken. At worst, they have been part of
layered lies and attempts by malevolent myth mongers to exclude and oppress others, to deny
responsibility, or to support radical revisionist ambitions. A claim that the only actors with formal
participatory roles and/or recognized rights and duties other than the state have been natural
individual persons is similarly mistaken. For example, this article has documented the manifest
reach of international law to such non-individual entities as a company, corporation, union,
vessel, court house, insurgent, belligerent, tribe, free city, people, and nation, among others.143
As demonstrated above, the historic narrative of international law was that sovereign states
constituted the sole actor capable of violating international law.144 However, this historic portrayal no
longer makes sense.145 The next section explains how the ritualistic distinction between “states” and
“corporations” no longer comports with our globalized world today and discusses the blurring of the
distinction between sovereigns and corporations.
III. WHY THE FOUNDATIONAL PREMISE IS WRONG – TODAY’S INTERNATIONAL
LAW ACTORS INCLUDE GLOBAL CORPORATIONS
The historical perspective consigning the sole actor status in international law to states was
sensible when formal distinctions reflected the unique roles public actor sovereigns and private actor
136See Ku, supra n. 18, at 356.
137Id. at 354–55.
138Ku, supra, n. 4, at 733.
139Ku, supra n. 18, at 355. (“Indeed, customary law has only endorsed direct private-actor liability in the context of
international criminal law, and even this somewhat-uncertain liability extends only to natural persons.”)
140Id. at 364.
141Ku, supra, n. 4, at 734.
142Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretext of Exclusion, 51 Va. J. Int’l Law 977,
978 (2011); See also Roger P. Alford, Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law Violations,
38 Pepp. L. Rev. 233, 234 (2011) (“There is no question that international law grants rights and imposes duties on entities
other than states.”).
143Id. at 1003–1004 (2011).
144See supra, nn. 126–141 and accompanying text.
145See Muchlinski, supra n. 6, at 687–688 (2011) (discussing recent cases in continental Europe where corporations
have been defendants in suits claiming the corporations are liable for environmental damage, human rights abuses and
war crimes).
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corporations played. However, the unique status of states as the actors in international law is a relic of
a bygone era.146 The state “has lost its monopoly” as the exclusive actor in international law.147
Globalization and the blurring of the roles between states and corporations combine to make the
“states only” paradigm of international law obsolete.
The old understanding of international law as something created solely by and for sovereigns is
defunct. Today the production and enforcement of international law increasingly depends on
private actors, not traditional political authorities. As with other public services that we used to
take for granted—schools, prisons, energy utilities, and transportation networks—privatization
has come to international law.148
In the past, states constituted the sole actors in international law as states were the actors capable of
causing damage. However, three dynamic forces militate in favor of finding the distinction between
states and global corporations antiquated: corporations are highly influential and powerful, capable of
causing colossal harm;149governments have outsourced many public functions150 and governments
have entered the private sector.151
A. The global corporation and The State: A comparison of near equals
Distinction between economically powerful states and large global corporations no longer reflects our
interconnected global order. Thus, the states only paradigm “has become completely outdated in our
time.”152 Key players in international law can be states, global institutions, global corporations, and
individuals.153 Non-state actors, including large corporations, wield increasing influence over
international affairs.154 International relations today are the product of “[a] complex matrix of
trans-national (if not supra-national) networks and relations, created by a great variety of non-state
actors; international public companies; transnational (TNCs) or multinational corporations (MNCs), non
government organizations (NGOs), international institutions, etc.”155
Large global corporations, possessing enormous power and influence, and conducting business
across virtual borders can be considered as quasi or virtual states.
Every day, Google, RIM, and Facebook are behaving more like sovereign nations than
corporations—controlling populations, taxing citizens, and passing laws regulating insiders and
outsiders who conduct commerce within their virtual borders. Their future independence will
solidify their sovereignty from unilateral regulation by any other nation, terrestrial or otherwise.
In short, Google, RIM, and Facebook can already act with relative impunity. Each has sufficient
power that it is impossible for any traditional nation to truly control them. If you need evidence,
witness China’s failed attempt to ban Google when China’s population demanded access. Or
Facebook’s frequent changes to their privacy policies, largely ignoring concerns of local
regulators and legislators. The U.S. and the EU can pass all the rules they want on behavioral
targeting, privacy, or data protection.156
Underscoring the similarities to sovereigns, corporations enjoy rights under international law. For
example, rights conferred by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.157 Indeed, corporations have filed claims in the European Court of Human
146As noted supra n. 142–43 and accompanying text, some have argued that any such distinction was erroneous.
147See Domingo, supra n. 130, at 639.
148See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1574–1575 (2011).
149Alvarez, supra n. 37, at 5.
150See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (2003) (“Recent privatization efforts,
particularly in health care and welfare programs, public education, and prisons, reveal a trend of greater discretion and
broader responsibilities being delegated to private hands.”).
151See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Rgulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 Transnatl. L. & Contemp. Probs. 3, 61–62 (2010).
152See Domingo, supra n. 130, at 639.
153Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, 185 (1996).
154Id.
155See Domingo, supra n. 130, at 639.
156See Douglas J. Wood, Say Hello to the World’s New Sovereign Nations: Facebook, Google and RIM (“Say hello to the
new sovereign nations of Google, RIM, and Facebook. Facebook now has more than five hundred million members, a
population that would make it the third-largest nation in the world. Google, used everyday by hundreds of millions, is the




157Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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Rights (“ECHR”) for infringements on the corporation’s rights.158 The ECHR has enforced corporate
rights extensively. “[T]he idea that companies and other entities qualify for protection under the ECHR
has been so accepted within the Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence that there is literally no discussion
on the question in court opinions.”159
Interestingly, corporations might argue that if they are to be treated as state-like entities bearing
state-like responsibilities, corporations also enjoy rights similar to states, such as sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law.160 However, it is generally applied in a restrictive
fashion, meaning commercial activity or private-sector activity is not subject to immunity.161 “The
restrictive theory is linked to the phenomenon of states entering the marketplace and taking part in
commercial activities like private persons.”162 If the corporation is engaging in a “for profit” commercial
endeavor, immunity should be inapplicable as it would fall within the rubric of restrictive sovereign
immunity as it does for sovereign nations.
A significant measure of power is the extent of wealth attributable to an actor.163 Against this
benchmark, large global corporations’ wealth often rivals the financial power of states. Coupled with
technology, global corporate power and influence rivals, and may eclipse, state power.164
“With the largest [transnational corporations] headquartered in the United States, Europe, and
Japan, a single multinational firm today can wield as much economic power and influence as an
entire nation.”165
Wielding enormous power and resources in our globalized free-enterprise oriented world,166
“[t]he Corporation’ assumes a central position in modern economic life due mainly to the fact that
major portions of our economic activities are performed by corporations.”167 Large transnational
corporations are the norm in this 21st Century world168 and are “crucial actors in international business
and have taken the mantle of economic leadership and development once relegated primarily to
nation states.”169 This fact alone militates strongly in favor of rejecting a formalistic “no liability” view.
158See e.g., Agrotexim v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) (1995) (holding that the company, and not its shareholders, is
the proper rights holder) (available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i¼001-57951#{“itemi
d”:[“001-57951”]}).
159Ku, supra n. 4, at 748–749. See also the United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Commn., 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that corporations have rights to free speech).
160See Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else? 21 Eur. J. Intl. L. 853 (available at http://ejil.
oxfordjournals.org/content/21/4/853.full#fn-20) (sovereign immunity immunizes sovereigns from liability). The principle of
sovereign immunity is not without scholarly criticism. University of California, Irvine Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
critiques sovereign immunity based in part on the failure of accountability. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign
Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201, 1213–14 (2001) (citing to the ruling in U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) wherein the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled sovereign immunity absolved the American government for damages arising out of governmental
human medical experimentation using LSD in the 1950s. Dissenting, Justice Brennan noted the doctrine would also
absolve Nazi Germany for human medical experimentation. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
161The European Convention on State Immunity (“ECSI”) and the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
(“UNCJIS”) utilize this theory. See e.g., ECSI Art. 3 (contractual obligation) and Art. 7 (commercial activities within the forum
state) and UNCJIS Art. 10 (commercial transactions). The United States also uses a commercial activity exception to
sovereign immunity. See FSIA § 1605(a)(2) (commercial activities either within or with direct effect on the United States).
162See Finke, supra n. 160.
163Laurence Lessig’s book, Republic Lost, documents how financially powerful private corporations have acquired great
influence and power to such a degree that such entities constitute a danger to the United States. See also Thomas B. Edsell,
Putting Political Reform Right Into the Pockets of the Nation’s Voters, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14, 2011) (available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/12/15/books/republic-lost-campaign-finance-reform-book-review.html?pagewanted¼all) (“With
billions of dollars at stake, corporations—and powerful interests in general—have consistently found ways both to avoid
and evade obstacles. Those with power have an unbroken record of finding ways to navigate around reform laws or turn
regulatory standards to their own advantage. For example, the primary users of the Freedom of Information Act are not
journalists and crusaders seeking to reveal illicit activities; they are businesses seeking to find out what government
regulators are up to and what their competitors have disclosed to government agencies.”) (paragraph break omitted).
164Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 Rutgers J. L. & Pub. Policy
334, 357 (2009) (“The ‘corporate rise to power’ accelerated during the trade liberalization era of the 1990s to eclipse that of
even some nation states.”).
165See Vega, supra n. 62, at 386.
166Chow, supra n. 13, at 817. (“The globalization of manufacturing operations by MNCs has been a hallmark of the
modern age and has allowed MNCs to greatly increase their power and influence.”)
167Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative View, 6 Cardozo J. Intl. &
Comp. L. 99 (1998).
168See Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Emerging Lex Aviatica, 42 Geo. J. Intl. L. 639, 640 (2011).
169See Joel Slawotsky, The Global Corporation as International Law Actor, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. Dig. 79, 84 (2012) (available at
http://www.vjil.org/assets/pdfs/vjilonline2/Slawotsky_Post_Production.pdf.
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As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Citizens United, corporations are “the principal agents of
the modern free economy.”170
In the technology-driven globalized world where money constitutes influence and power, the
large global corporation wields awesome control. Indeed, ownership of large transnational enterprises
constitutes authority. “In a global economy, ownership of companies is the most important way to
have influence.”171
As corporations increased their public actor role, their “state-like power over their constituents of
society did not wane, but instead increased.”172 Large global corporations shape and influence the
nations that they operate in:173
MNCs play a central role in the movement of capital and technology from developed countries
to developing countries and thus have become major players in determining the economic,
political, and social welfare of nations, particularly in developing nations that have a strong
hunger for foreign capital and technology.174
To be sure, there have been prior examples of corporations wielding state like power over private
citizens. For example, the British East Indies Company (“Company”) was a state-controlled company
that was enormously influential over India and wielded both private and public actor power.
“The East India Company foreshadowed the modern world in all sorts of striking ways . . . . And—
particularly relevant at the moment—it was the first state-backed company to make its mark on
the world.”175 The Company was simultaneously involved in private market activity but also was
enmeshed in administrative control, tax collection, and military power.176 The similarities
continue: the Company enjoyed business monopolies. “Many of today’s state-owned companies
are monopolies or quasi-monopolies.”177 The Company was thus remarkably similar to today’s
state-owned enterprise and serves as an example of an actor that yields both public and
private power.
The Company serves as an exemplar of an actor simultaneously possessing public and private actor
functions similar to today’s large global corporation. However, as most historical comparisons, the
parallels between the Company and today’s state-owned firms are not exact. “The East India Company
controlled a standing army of some 200,000 men, more than most European states.”178 Another
distinguishing characteristic was the Company’s shares were not owned by the British government but
rather by some government employees. In contrast, “[t]oday’s state-capitalist governments hold huge
blocks of shares in their favourite companies.”179 In addition, while the Company controlled large
swaths of India (and several other locales), today’s large global corporation may have tremendous
influence in many nations and over a substantially larger number of people. Moreover, today’s global
corporation is empowered through powerful technology which can dominate a nation’s strategic
industries such as financial, energy, communication and defense. The Company, while powerful and
bearing similarities to today’s large global corporation, did not have the same extent of influence held
by today’s large global corporation. “The current interrelated financial, economic, climate, energy, food,
water, political, and security crises affecting the globe only highlight the historically unprecedented
degree of interconnectivity and interdependence.”180
Notwithstanding these differences the Company’s conduct establishes that there were historical
exceptions to the traditional demarcations between states and corporations.
In today’s world, both states and corporations have similar or even identical interests. This alignment
of interests between sovereigns and large global corporations has been magnified by “globalization [ ]
that has revolutionized the way business (and many other aspects of life) is now conducted in the
170Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 393 (Scalia, Alito, & Thomas, J.J., concurring).
171Mark Landler, supra n. 52 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/worldbusiness/04norway.
html?_r¼2&oref¼slogin&) (quoting Norwegian Finance Minister Kristin Halversen).
172Jackson, supra n. 38, at 330.
173See e.g., Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163 (Nigeria outsourcing healthcare to Pfizer).
174Chow, supra n. 13, at 817.
175The Company That Ruled the Waves, The Economist (Dec 17, 2011) (available at http://www.economist.com/node/





180Pitts, supra n. 164, at 335.
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modern world.”181 This coalition of interests underscores the blurring of the distinction between public
states and private corporations.
In international relations, there are no enduring values as in the case of interpersonal relations.
For states, there are mostly shifting interests of a passing nature. The states’ goals of power and
wealth are in frequent contrast with the human goals of justice and peace aspirations. The
protagonists of state interests all too often prevail over those advocating justice and peace.182
Both public states and private corporations have goals of financial power and wealth. Why should
corporations be treated differently particularly in today’s global economy where states are private
market actors in the private realm and private corporations engage in public actor functions. There is an
absence of any reason, let alone a compelling one, militating towards treating a corporation differently
so as to exempt them from liability. Since global corporations wield state like powers, corporate actors
should be treated as quasi-state entities. Excluding a private corporate actor from liability for violations
of international law runs is counter intuitive.
“Limiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation directing the individual’s
action . . . makes little sense in today’s world.”183
The global business, political and economic environments have drastically changed. The narrow view
distinguishing between “sovereigns” and “corporations” must yield to the new realties: multiple actors
exist spanning the globe that posses both public and private actor characteristics in varying degrees.
The world has since changed, and long-standing legal concepts are being increasingly challenged
by dramatic cross-border developments that no longer allow domestic land laws to exist in
isolation, but insteadpresent pressing issues of cross-influences, regionalism, anduniversalism.184
These hybrid actors operate across borders and utilize major bases of business operations over
continents, and exert enormous influence. “[G]lobalization is indeed producing an incomplete yet
significant form of authority deep within the national State, that is, a hybrid authority that is neither fully
private nor fully public, neither fully national nor fully global.”185
Moreover, not only do large global corporations possess enormous financial power, with the
associated powerful influences, there is yet another reason to re-think the distinctions between states
and corporations as private actors. As detailed in the next section, while historically a line of
demarcation existed wherein corporations acted in the private sphere and states acted in the public
realm, that line is becoming blurred.
B. The blurring of the distinctions between private and public actors
Another factor militating in favor of finding global corporations as state-like actors is the evisceration of
the traditional distinctions between public actor states and private actor corporations. Our world today
no longer consists of pure private actors and pure public actors neatly divided and governed either by
domestic or international law. Norway’s SWF provides an example of this phenomenon.
Norway has provided an architecture of governance that sits astride the borders of market and
state, of public and private, and of national and international. It’s efforts to institutionalize this
border-riding governance provides a window into the shape of cooperative and inter-systemic
governance that is likely to play a greater role in shaping behavior in this century.186
Private corporations are actors in the public arena taking a role in traditionally state functions. The
public functions of education, policing and defense operations no longer depend exclusively on public
actors within a specific nation state but are affected by private corporations conducting business
across borders. Indeed, large multinational corporations have been referred to as virtual “states.”187
181Chow, supra n. 13, at 815.
182See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 Va. J. Intl. L. 269, 282 (2010).
183In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d. 7, 58–59 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
184Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the Land, 81 U. Col. L. Rev. 425, 427 (2010).
185SaskiaSassen,BorderingCapabilities VersusBorders: Implications forNationalBorders, 30Mich. J. Intl. L. 567, 579 (2009).
186See Backer, supra n. 30, at 10.
187See Douglas J. Wood, Say Hello to the World’s New Sovereign Nations: Facebook, Google and RIM (“Say hello to the
new sovereign nations of Google, RIM, and Facebook. Facebook now has more than five hundred million members, a
population that would make it the third-largest nation in the world. Google, used everyday by hundreds of millions, is the
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Parallel to the development of private corporate actors operating in the public realm, the traditional
private sector functions of capital market investment and the quest for profits are no longer the
exclusive province of private entities. States are operating in the business world as private actors
through vehicles such as sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) whereby they actively invest in world equity
markets.188 SWFs demonstrate convincingly that states are involved in traditionally private sector roles.
States also own private sector businesses through state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”). Thus, the role of
the private sector is no longer relegated exclusively to corporations. Given the blurring of the
distinctions, there is little basis to treat global corporations differently than states.189
1. Corporations acting in the public sphere
Recent years have witnessed the state becoming unanchored from its public function moorings. “Just
as law-making might have become unmoored from the state, the state has itself become unmoored.
And so the issue of corporate citizenship serves as a proxy for the equally important converse issues –
that of the private rights of states as participants in global markets.”190 To a remarkable extent,
corporations have replaced the role of the state.191 Private actors “can and do perform government
functions, from providing expertise to monitoring compliance with regulations to negotiating the
substance of those regulations, both domestically and internationally.”192
Numerous historically “state” roles have been replaced by corporations.193 The antiquated notion
that states exclusively control the political, economic and social life of citizens must acquiesce to the
fact that corporations are “actors who cannot be associated with a certain nation-state as their home
base” and who wield enormous influence within states.194
In addition to wielding enormous economic power, corporations increasingly engage in state-
like activity as a result of the privatization of traditional state functions (e.g., the management
of prisons, public welfare programs, public utilities, and wars) and the tendency of corporations
to elect to operate in environments where state power is weak or non-existent.195
Sovereigns often privatize or outsource to corporations the performance of traditionally state
services. “The most common form of privatization in this arena has been outsourcing, an arrangement
in which the government contracts with a private entity to render goods or services previously provided
by the government.”196 These formerly state-run functions, now conducted by private corporations,
span the gamut of health care, welfare, education and prisons,197 policing,198 imprisonment,199 military
defense functions,200 private sector construction of public sector infrastructure,201 and other
traditionally governmental services.202
188See Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superpowers: How U.S. Regulators Should
Respond, 40 Geo. J. Intl. L. 1239, 1250 (2009).
189See Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 Nw. U. J. Intl.
Hum. Rights 262 (2008) (“Corporations, especially multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’), have become ever larger and more
powerful since the 1970s, often surpassing the economic power and influence of states.”)
190See Larry Catá Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonization and its Challenges for the Legal State, in The Law of the Future
and the Future of Law 427, 431 (Sam Muller et al., eds. Torkel Opsahl Acad. EPublisher 2011) (available at http://www.fichl.
org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_11_Web.pdf).
191See Jeffrey Bone, Legal Perspectives on Corporate Responsibility: Contractarian or Communitarian Thought? 24 Can.
J. L. & Jur. 277, 301 (2011).
192Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 9 (Princeton U. Press 2004).
193See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1216 (2008) reviewing Paul
Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty (2007).
194See Gralf-Peter Calliess, Transnational Corporations Revisited, 18 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 601, 607 (2011). See also
Chow, supra n. 13, at 815–16.
195See Ronald Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 Brook. J. Intl. L. 955, 961 (2008).
196See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. Chi.
Legal F. 265, 266 (2010).
197SeeMetzger, supra, n. 150, at 1369 (“Recent privatization efforts, particularly in health care and welfare programs, public
education, and prisons, reveal a trend of greater discretion and broader responsibilities being delegated to private hands.”).
198See Elizabeth Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 83–95 (2004).
199See Daphne Barak-Erez, The Private Prison Controversy and The Privatization Continuum, 5 Law & Ethics Hum. Rts.
138, 139–48 (2011).
200See e.g., Simon Chesterman, We Can’t Spy If We Can’t Buy!: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of
Outsourcing Inherently Governmental Functions, 19 Eur. J. Intl. L. 1055, 1056–73 (2008).
201See generally, Laura A. Malinsky, Rebuilding with Broken Tools: Build-Operate-Transfer Law in Vietnam, 14 Berkeley
J. Intl. L. 438 (1996).
202See generally, Government Companies Law 1975 SH No. 5735 (Israel).
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The privatization of prisons serves as an example of the outsourcing phenomenon.
In response to the explosion in prison population prompted by the drug enforcement policies
of the 1980s and 1990s, governments began to rely more heavily upon the private sector for the
provision of corrections services for adults. As a result, a significant number of state and federal
prisoners are now in the custody of private entities.203
Private policing exemplifies another manifestation of the private actor engaged in the public sector.
Protection of citizens and their property—a traditional core governmental sphere—is increasingly
conducted by private actors. As one corporate executive noted, “today much of the protection of our
people, and their property and their businesses, has been turned over to private security.”204 The trend
is global, and private sector policing is gaining popularity in many nations including Canada, Australia,
and the U.K.,205 and includes criminal investigations and arrests.206 It is generally recognized that, in
the United States, “[u]niformed private guards . . . now routinely guard and patrol office buildings,
factories, warehouses, schools, sports facilities, concert halls, train stations, airports, shipyards,
shopping centers, parks, government facilities—and, increasingly, entire commercial districts and
residential neighborhoods.”207
Governmental outsourcing spans a variety of areas such as: drafting health policies; performing
military defense functions; implementing border control; immigration, and implementation of asylum
policies.
In the U.K., the government has asked private sector food corporations to assist drafting policy on
food and alcohol.208 There is a trend whereby private actors are assisting or replacing states with
respect to rights. A “primary example of such reconfiguration of human rights is the manner in which
the enforcement of human rights in the crucial area of labour rights is moved from states and
international organizations to market actors via the idea of CSR (corporate social responsibility).”209
States are increasingly depending upon private contractors to perform traditionally state military
functions.210 “[I]t is clear that a broader array of non-state actors—from contractors to transnational
terrorist organizations to regional bodies—are actively involved in today’s battlefields.”211 Examples of
public actor defense functions conducted by private entities include “truck driving to training for
specialist military, police and security operations, communications support, aerial surveillance,
intelligence, training, strategic planning, armed personal security, and conducting drone attacks.”212
Another illustration of corporate involvement in a traditional state function is the privatization of
immigration and asylum. “It is clear that we are witnessing a gradual process in which states dilute
their own exercise of sovereign power towards immigrants and transfer more authority to private
and other non-state actors.”213 The privatization of border control and immigration has been
well-documented.214 “Border control, admission of immigrants, social integration, and distribution
of benefits and membership rights to persons are all thought of in international legal doctrine as acts of
state sovereignty.”215
In addition, states are outsourcing the providing of “economic and social benefits to asylum
seekers,” involving “private persons, corporations and NGOs” on a large scale.216 “In some cases,
203Fairfax, supra n. 196, at 271 (footnotes omitted).
204See e.g., Hearings Regarding Private Security Guards Before Subcomm. On Human Resources of the House Comm. On
Education and Labor, 103d Cong. 132 (1993) (statement of Guardsmark, Inc. President Ira Lipman).
205David A. Sklansky, Private Policing and Human Rights, 5 L. & Eth. of Hum. Rts. 112, 115 (2011).
206See Joh, supra n.198, at 83–95.
207Sklansky, supra n. 205, at 114–15.
208Felicity Lawrence,McDonald’s and PepsiCo to Help Write UK Health Policy, The Guardian (Nov. 12, 2010) (available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/12/mcdonalds-pepsico-help-health-policy). (“The Department of Health is
putting the fast food companies McDonald’s and KFC and processed food and drink manufacturers such as PepsiCo,
Kellogg’s, Unilever, Mars and Diageo at the heart of writing government policy on obesity, alcohol and diet-related disease,
the Guardian has learned.”)
209See B.S. Chimni, Prolegomena Class Approach To International Law, 21 Eur. J. Intl. L. 57, 73 (2010) (describing how the
debate on labor standards has shifted from a state-oriented focus to a focus on global corporations).
210See generally, Chesterman, supra n. 200.
211Daphné Richemond-Barak, Rethinking Private Warfare, 5 L. & Eth. of Hum. Rts. 159, 165 (2011).
212Id. at 165–66.
213Tally Kritzman-Amir, Privatization and Delegation of State Authority in Asylum Systems, 5 L. & Eth. of Hum. Rts. 193,
199 (2011).
214Id. at n. 23.
215Id. at 198.
216Id. at 209.
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states privatize these service providers, giving a franchise to operators who directly provide them,” and
“ . . . . these service providers are profit-driven and profit-oriented, a consideration that does not always
conform to international and domestic obligations towards refugees.”217
Although states were once the primary vehicle to impose obligations, global corporations are taking
a substantial role. As detailed above, global developments have conferred ever greater “public actor”
power in corporations and corporate “state-like power over their constituents” is ever-increasing.218 It is
incontrovertible that private corporations engage in activities once considered within the exclusive
realm of official state actor. This demonstrates convincingly that private corporations no longer act
solely as pure private actors.
2. States acting in the private sphere
A similar disconnect between traditional roles has occurred in the private sector. The historical
activities of the private sector–such as providing investment capital, trading for profit in the equity and
debt markets, long-term ownership of shares in publicly traded corporations, venture capital,
commodity extraction, real estate development and large scale farming–are no longer the exclusive
roles of private individual and corporate actors. In these areas, sovereigns are increasingly taking on a
private actor role similar to the roles of private individuals and corporations.
Larry Backer adroitly described this growing phenomenon:
This participation of states directly in markets (production, ownership, finance and the like)
is not merely in the old and now fairly tame form of public, central planning-based,
political regimes, or the sort of ownership that traditionally constituted state enterprises,
i.e., mercantilist/Marxist-Leninist undertakings with a long and well understood history and
purpose. What distinguishes this sovereign activity from its mid-20th Century form is the
willingness of states not only to limit their control of internal economies, but also to invest
their financial wealth outside their national borders. In this respect, states assume the very
role of the private economic actors that they once feared so much. The 21st Century is
witnessing a dramatic rise in the willingness of states to project economic power both at
home and in host states through the same economic vehicles that threatened the states’
power in the 20th Century. The facilitating cause of this change in approach is the
creation of the very system that frees economic actors from the constraints of territory and
more closely binds public actors thereto. Just as private economic entities may now cross
borders to affect transactions that maximize their wealth, so states are now discovering
that they might do the same thing. Economic globalization does not exclude private
market participants from its system of freely moving capital. Just as private actors are
subject to the regulation and control of the sovereign in whose territories they act, states
acting outside their borders as participants in local economic activity assume a similar
character. Consequently, some states seem to have become, to some extent, pools of
national economic wealth, the power of which matches or exceeds their traditional
sovereign power.219
Indeed, similar to corporations, states have “reinvented” themselves and take on multiple roles
including public, private and mixed. “[G]overnments are empowering themselves along multiple
dimensions.”220 Both sovereign wealth fund investments and the state-owned enterprise illustrate how
public actor states are now operating in the private sector.
a. Sovereign wealth funds: The blurring of distinctions between public and private actors221 is
further exemplified by the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”). SWFs are financial
superstars which allow public states to engage in private market activity.222 SWFs are “large pools of
capital” owned and controlled by various public states.223 The amounts of capital owned and deployed
217Id. at 210.
218Jackson, supra n. 38, at 331.
219Backer, supra n. 151, at 10–11 (emphasis added).
220José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 Minn. J. Intl. L. 223, 256 (2011).
221See Havel & Sanchez, supra n. 168, at 659 (“The very existence of the Montebello Statement of Principles testies to an
alternative narrative of converging public and private action.”)
222Backer, supra n. 151, at 59 (“It is clear that SWFs represent a multifaceted nexus point for the convergence of public
and private law. On the one hand, SWFs encompass attempts by states to participate in global markets like private
individuals. On the other hand, SWFs may govern by other means. SWFs potentially allow states to convert private markets
into public arenas through which they might project political and regulatory power abroad.”).
223Slawotsky, supra n. 188, at 1251.
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by state-owned SWFs are staggering.224 SWFs are increasingly acquiring ownership stakes in
corporations all over the globe. State actor SWFs are involved in: utilities,225 banking,226 brokerage,227
stock exchanges,228 warehouses,229 farming,230 and infrastructure.231
By 2009, several Middle East funds had acquired substantial minority interests in the London
Stock Exchange (Qatar SWF; UAE Dubai SWF), NASDAQ (UAE Dubai SWF); and the Bombay
Stock Exchange (UAE Dubai SWF). As a consequence, SWFs are moving into positions of
influence in contests for control of some of these Exchanges–a role that puts them in a
position to affect the scope and character of markets in which securities are traded, and which
serve as a source for corporate regulation beyond the state.232
Whether a SWF controls, dominates, or outright buys a corporation there can benodoubt that such activity
represents involvement in a traditionally “non-state” activity resulting in states conducting business as
private actors. The SWF phenomenon illustrates how states are no longer acting as pure public actors.
b. State-owned enterprises: Another example of the blurring of the demarcation between public and
private actors is the state-owned enterprise (“SOE”). SOEs are involved in direct or partial ownership of
business projects and joint venture partners with other states and corporations on a global basis. Large
global SOEs have become substantial market players internationally.233 “State-controlled companies
account for 80%of themarket capitalisation [sic] of the Chinese stockmarket, more than 60%of Russia’s,
and 35%of Brazil’s. Theymake up 19of theworld’s 100 biggestmultinational companies and 28of the top
100amongemergingmarkets.”234 TheSOE represents a very powerful segmentof the global economyand
their market value rivals or surpasses the market value of private corporations in some nations.235
224Id. at 1239 (citing to financial data indicating that SWFs would be wielding nearly $10 trillion within a few years).
225See Mark Scott, China’s Wealth Fund Buys Stake in British Utility, The DealB%K (Jan. 20, 2012) (available at http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/chinas-sovereign-wealth-fund-buys-minority-stake-in-british-utility/) (“The China
Investment Corporation, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, announced Friday that it had acquired an 8.68 percent stake
in Thames Water, Britain’s largest water and sewerage company.”).
226See Elisa Martinuzzi & Sonia Sirletti, Aabar to Raise UniCredit Stake to Become Bank’s No.1 Investor, Bloomberg
Business Week (Jan. 18, 2012) (available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-18/aabar-to-raise-unicredit-s
take-to-become-bank-s-no-1-investor.html)
(“Aabar Investments PJS, the Abu Dhabi-based sovereign wealth fund, plans to increase its stake in UniCredit SpA to
6.5 percent through the lender’s rights offer, which would make it the bank’s biggest investor.”)
227See Yang Sung-jin, Korean Sovereign Fund Suffers Loss, The Korean Herald (Jan. 11, 2012) (available at http://www.
koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId¼20120111000977) (“Korea Investment Corporation, Korea’s sovereign
wealth fund, suffered a net loss of 3.3 percent in terms of average yield last year, hurt by the turmoil in the global financial
market and a massive loss linked to its investment in Merrill Lynch, industry sources said Wednesday.
The main culprit for the deeper loss is KIC’s poor stock investment, particularly concerning its holdings in Merrill
Lynch. In early 2008, KIC bought $2 billion worth of Merrill Lynch shares, but the U.S. firm was later taken over by Bank of
America in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. As a result, KIC came to own 69 million shares in BoA, but due to
plunging share prices, the fund’s losses stemming from its stake in BoA are estimated to have reached $1.3 billion.”)
228See Niklas Magnusson & Will McSheehy, Dubai, Qatar Buy Rival Stakes in LSE, OMX Exchanges, Bloomberg.com (Sept.
20, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid¼newsarchive&refer ¼ Europe&sid ¼ aY65yLteROQE. (“Qatar
Investment Authority said it purchased 20 percent of LSE shares and 9.98 percent of OMX, a move that may thwart
Nasdaq’s plans to acquire the Stockholm-based exchange.”)
229See Kathleen Chu, Global Logistic, CIC to Buy $1.6 Billion of Japan Warehouses, Bloomberg.com (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011–12-19/global-logistic-cic-to-buy-1-6-billion-of-japanese-assets-from-lasalle.html.
(“Global Logistic Properties Ltd. (GLP), a unit of the Government of Singapore Investment Corp., and China Investment
Corp. agreed to buy 15 Japanese warehouses for 122.6 billion yen ($1.6 billion) as demand for modern storage is
rebounding after the March earthquake.”)
230See Rabah Arezki et al., International Monetary Fund, Global Land Rush, 49 Fin. & Dev. 1 (Mar. 2012), http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/03/arezki.htm (“The sharp increase in international food prices during 2007–08
triggered a spate of cross-border land acquisitions by sovereign wealth funds, private equity funds.”).
231See Peter Edwards, BORIS: FOREIGN CASH CAN PAY FOR AIRPORT (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.cityam.com/latest-news/boris-
foreign-cash-can-pay-airport (“A NEW airport for the Thames Estuary could be built in as little as six years and backed by
sovereign wealth funds, Boris Johnson claimed yesterday.”)(emphasis in the original).
232See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds As Market Operators, Law at the End of the Day (July 4, 2011), http://
lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/sovereign-wealth-fund-as-market.html.
233SeePeterMulchinski, TheChangingFaceof Transnational BusinessGovernance, 18 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 665–695 (2011).
234See Ruled the Waves, supra n. 175.
235See The Economist, New Masters of the Universe (Jan. 21, 2012) (available at http://www.economist.com/node/
21542925) [hereinafter New Masters].
(“The most striking thing about state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is their sheer collective might in the emerging world. They
make up most of the market capitalisation of China’s and Russia’s stock markets and account for 28 of the emerging
world’s 100 biggest companies.”)
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These large business entities serve as examples of the partnership between the state and private
sector and illustrate the alignment of interests between state controlled/owned corporations and the
private sector. “There is a certain symmetry between private and state-owned MNE.”236 The SOE
constitutes a form of traditional private corporate activity being conducted by the “state” as a private
actor conducting business on an international scale.237 Many global energy producers are state-owned
national petroleum corporations. “Thirteen of the world’s biggest oil companies are state-controlled.
So is the world’s biggest natural-gas company, Gazprom.”238
More generally, national energy companies are no longer content just to sit at home and pump
the oil or gas. They are increasingly venturing abroad in order to lock up future energy supplies
or forming alliances with private-sector specialists to increase their access to expertise and
ideas. Gazprom has been buying up oil and gas companies across eastern Europe and Asia.
In 2008 it bought a 51% stake in Naftna Industrija Srbije, a Serbian energy giant. Chinese oil
companies have been striking deals across Africa: in 2006 Sinopec bought a huge Angolan oil
well for $692m. The multiplying alliances between national and international companies are
not always successful: BP, for example, will not rush into any future deals with Russia’s Rosneft.
But they are plugging national energy companies into the global market for people and ideas
and closing the gap between the state-run and the private sector.239
SOEs thus provide yet another example of the erosion of the unique distinctions between states and
private corporations. The SOE exemplifies the increasing phenomenon of states engaging in private
actor functions on a global scale and underscores the erosion of the distinction between states and
corporations.240 Accordingly, the theoretical underpinning for holding that only sovereigns bear
international legal obligations has similarly been eliminated.
CONCLUSION
Global corporations engage in misconduct that can cause severe harm in the nations those private
entities operate in. Immunization from legal liability may play a role in the decision to conduct business
in a foreign state. “Using sophisticated corporate structures often involving a parent holding
corporation and various overseas manufacturing subsidiaries, MNCs have been able to set up
transnational production chains that can bypass or evade national laws on labor and the
environment.”241 The Bhopal disaster highlights the problem of a corporation that finds the cost of
misconduct overseas less severe than in its home jurisdiction.242
To impose legal obligations on “states” but disallow these same obligations on “corporations” is
an inherently flawed approach. To treat the large global corporation as not being subject to international
law will potentially allow multinationals to engage in liability arbitrage. Such corporations can transfer
litigation risk by selecting jurisdictions to engage in misconduct known for weak sovereign power.
Moreover, “[p]owerful multinational corporations can pressure captive developing country governments,
desperate more for income than for labor or environmental protections, to adopt friendly legislation.”243
The corporate liability issue is significant because as noted by the Norwegian SWF, many
corporations act in areas of weak governance permitting them to engage in or be complicit in
misconduct. As Norway’s Ethics Council notes:
[M]any of these companies were in direct violation of domestic law, the host state country did
nothing to stop the violation of its own law and at time[]s supported the companies in their
work.244
236Mulchinski, supra n. 233, at 697.
237See Backer, supra n. 151, at 61–62.
238See Ruled the Waves, supra n. 175.
239See New Masters, supra n. 235.
240See Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work, 5 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 105, 150
(2006). (“There is no reason to treat states differently from private actors if a state is becoming a participant in a private
agreement or in a combination with others to restrain trade.”).
241See Chow, supra n. 13, at 817.
242Id. at n.124 (“For example, some MNCs take advantage of lax environmental laws to set up dangerous operations
overseas. Union Carbide, a U.S.-based multinational company, was able to set up a manufacturing facility in Bhopal, India.
A gas leak from the Bhopal plant led to the deaths of more than 2,000 people and injured many more. Although Union
Carbide settled the case at a cost of about $470 million, the costs of such an accident, if it had occurred in the United
States, would have likely been much higher.”).
243Jackson, supra n. 38, at 351.
244Backer, supra n. 30, at 65.
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Corporations ought to be held accountable because in a global order where these large entities hold
sway, weak governance zones will be exploited. Holding corporations liable will help defend the
citizens residing in those governance challenged areas.
Given the incentive for corporations to operate in jurisdictions where laws or enforcement is lax,
there would be substantial incentive for misconduct if the actor knows there is an exemption of civil
liability.245 Indeed, as noted by Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein, the Kiobel holding perversely
“incentivizes states to abdicate state duties to corporations because incorporation may effectively
insulate all parties–states, armed groups, and corporations–from liability.”246 Under the no corporate
liability view, sovereigns can outsource misconduct and escape liability. To prevent corporate liability
would constitute a tantalizing incentive to engage in misconduct with the peace of mind no legal
consequences will arise.
The large global corporation should have “the same duties and responsibilities towards its
constituents as a state government.”247 Today, large corporations share similar characteristics with
state actors on the global stage. These juridical entities can wield more capital than many states, have
dozens if not hundreds of “bases” of operation across continents and in fact often perform traditionally
governmental functions. Moreover, traditionally state actors are increasingly operating in the arena of
private corporate actors, operating large sovereign investment funds, state-owned companies and
engaging in private market activity. Given the multiple roles states and private corporations play, and
the ensuing erosion of distinctions, there is no reason that international law obligations should remain
the sole province of sovereigns.
245See New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. U.S., 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) (“[W]e see no good reason why
corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purpose of their agents . . . If it were not
so, many offenses might go unpunished.”).
246See Gianni & Farbstein, supra n. 18 at 123.
247Jackson, supra n. 38, at 331.
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